Social media at 16: where does Belgium really stand?

The debate is often summed up in a simple sentence: "social media will be banned under 16". In Belgium, the reality is less spectacular — and much more interesting. There is, to date, no general federal ban preventing anyone under 16 from accessing a social network. Several levels of government are, however, working on protecting minors, while the European Union is tightening its requirements for platforms.

This distinction matters. A poorly explained age rule gives families the impression that a complex problem can be solved with a date of birth. Yet the risks do not begin the day a teenager creates an account and do not disappear on their sixteenth birthday. They stem from the way services are designed: recommendations that push users to stay connected, advertising profiling, unsolicited contacts, constant social comparison and data collection.

What has been decided and what is still under discussion

In April 2026, the Flemish Government decided to introduce a legal minimum age of 13 for certain platforms likely to harm the physical, mental or moral development of minors. This approach still has to be reconciled with European law, the powers of the country's various entities and the obligations already imposed on platforms.

The threshold of 16, for its part, appears mainly in the European debate. MEPs and experts argue that below this age, certain uses should require parental consent or additional protections. That does not mean all services would be treated the same way. A messaging app used by a school class, a peer-support forum and a platform built on video recommendations do not offer the same benefits or carry the same level of risk.

For a Belgian family, the practical conclusion is simple: be wary of headlines announcing a ban that is already in force. The rules are evolving, but for now responsibility still lies largely with platform design, account settings, guidance and media literacy.

Why an age limit is not enough

Imagine two teenagers of the same age. The first mainly chats with classmates they know, on a private account, with no notifications at night. The second receives a constant stream of videos chosen by an algorithm, messages from strangers and adverts built on their behaviour. On paper, they are both fifteen. Yet their exposure is in no way comparable.

A useful policy must therefore act on several levers:

• make minors' accounts private by default;
• limit contact from unknown adults;
• disable advertising profiling and precise geolocation;
• reduce the mechanisms that encourage compulsive use;
• give young people a simple way to report, block and ask for help;
• clearly explain why a piece of content is being recommended to them.

The Belgian Superior Health Council also stresses gradual autonomy. Between 13 and 16, the goal is not just to close doors, but to learn to recognise social pressure, disguised advertising, manipulation and situations where an adult needs to be called.

Verifying age without turning the internet into an ID check

The technical difficulty is real. A simple "I am over 16" tick box protects no one. Conversely, asking every young person to send a photo of their identity card would create an extremely sensitive database at dozens of platforms.

A better approach is to prove an attribute without revealing the whole identity. A trusted service could confirm that a person is above an age threshold and produce a cryptographic proof. The platform would then receive a limited answer — "threshold met" or "threshold not met" — without automatically obtaining the name, address, full date of birth or national register number.

This logic of minimal disclosure lies at the heart of the European age verification prototype and the European digital identity wallet. It sounds abstract, but the principle is very concrete: when a cinema checks that you are old enough, it does not need to keep a copy of your document. Online, the system should aim for the same restraint.

The safeguards to demand

An age verification solution is only acceptable if it withstands two dangers: data leaks and generalised tracking of usage.

In particular, it must be guaranteed:

• that no copy of a document is kept by the social network;
• that the proof cannot be reused to recognise the user on other services;
• that the issuer of the proof cannot see the content viewed;
• that an independent audit checks the code, the subcontractors and the retention periods;
• that a solution exists for young people without a recent smartphone or a compatible document;
• that an age error can be challenged quickly.

The risk of exclusion deserves as much attention as the technical risk. Protection designed only for well-equipped families would penalise young people who use a shared device, live in care or do not immediately have the required documents.

What parents can do today

Waiting for a future law is neither necessary nor realistic. A few well-handled conversations already go a long way.

Start by looking at the account settings together. Who can send messages? Who can see posts? Is location attached to photos? Can notifications be switched off in the evening? The exercise is more useful when done with the young person rather than for them: that way they learn to redo the settings in a new app.

Then talk about situations, not just screen time. A quarter of an hour of blackmail or bullying is more serious than two hours spent making a video with friends. Ask what the app brings them, what tires them out, what makes them uncomfortable and who they would talk to if there were a problem.

Finally, set a rule that protects their voice: asking for help must not automatically lead to the phone being confiscated. If the first consequence of speaking up is a punishment, the next incident will stay hidden.

The main responsibility still lies with the platforms

Families cannot audit an algorithm, detect a network of predatory adults or know that an advert specifically targets a minor's vulnerabilities. These responsibilities belong to the companies that design and operate the services.

Credible regulation must therefore measure results: the number of unwanted contacts blocked, how quickly reports are handled, the reduction in harmful recommendations, the absence of behavioural advertising and the quality of appeal procedures. A platform should not be able to call itself protective just because it has added an age confirmation screen.

Official sources

• Flemish Government — protecting minors on intermediary services (NL)
• European Commission — guidelines and age verification prototype
• European Parliament — protecting children's safety and mental health
• Superior Health Council — protecting young people from screens and social media